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ABSTRACT
Both asymmetric information (AI) and divergent expectations (DE) theories offer possible
explanations of the litigation puzzle.  Under DE, cases proceed to trial when, by chance, the plaintiff
is more optimistic than the defendant.  As the fraction of cases tried (T) declines, this leads to a
tendency toward 50 percent plaintiff win rates at trial (P), regardless of the fraction of plaintiff
winners in the filed population.  Under AI, by contrast, informed parties proceed to trial only when
they expect to win.  Hence, as the fraction of cases tried declines, plaintiff win rates at trial tend
toward either 0 or 1.  We present evidence that the relationship between T and P generated by the
litigation process is consistent with DE and not AI.  We also offer evidence of the presence of AI
early in litigation in the form of one-sided plaintiff win rates in cases adjudicated prior to trial.  We
reconcile these two findings with evidence that pretrial adjudication and settlement culls both likely
plaintiff winners and likely plaintiff losers from the filed pool, causing a tendency toward central
rather than extreme plaintiff win rates at trial.
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